

# BSPN

## THE BLACK SEA PEACEBUILDING NETWORK

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#### BLACK SEA PEACEBUILDING NETWORK GEORGIAN EXPERTS MEETING

On November 15th of 2012 the BSPN experts meeting was held in Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. Apart of the BSPN experts, representatives of the other civil society organisations attended the meeting.

This was a first meeting after the government change due to the peaceful transfer of power – result of the recent parliamentary elections in Georgia. Obviously, the presenters were invited to satisfy the natural interest of the public related to the differences in the old and new government views.

Ms. Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, First Deputy State Minister of Reintegration (the institution in charge of conflicts resolution) presented the “New Visions for the Regulations of Conflicts in Georgia” and Mr. Sergi Kapanadze, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (in charge of Geneva Talks), professor of the Tbilisi State University spoke about “Status Neutrality – a Key for the Settlement of Conflicts in Georgia”.

Ms. Tsikhelashvili stayed the new Georgian Government will not initiate changes in the conflict regulation related legislation adopted during the previous one, but will focus on practical aspect searching direct ways for building confidence and increasing the communication, development of projects of common interest with the Abkhazians, Ossetians sides and Russia.

Mr. Sergi Kapanadze exposed the analyses developing the idea of the Status-Neutral issues could be the only topics where the conflicting sides are able to cooperate or reach consensus in. In this regards, he advised the new government to take into account the outcomes and observations accumulated during the Geneva talks conducted by the previous government during last few years.

Both presentations deserved great interest of the audience and stimulated an active discussion.

# **NEW VIEWPOINTS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN GEORGIA**

Ketevan Tsikhelashvili

The space for putting new approaches of conflict resolution in practice is rather limited. Today the situation is far more complicated than our predecessors were to meet. There are certain situations, a certain reality received hereditarily which cannot be ignored. This is why some trends in politics are also characterized by the heredity passed on from the previous authority. We mean that, firstly, both regions – Abkhazia and Samachablo (South Ossetia) – are occupied. The direction of their non-recognition as independent states is equally important. As it is known, a weird club of the states followed Russia and, with Russia's effort, recognized these territories (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) as independent units. Consequently, it is very important to maintain this line – making efforts for their non-recognition. Hereditary are also the law about the occupied territories, an involvement strategy, an action plan, modalities, towards which our approach implies that, despite the fact, that there were mixed opinions and heated discussions while adopting this law and forming these modalities (October 2010), the law itself, resulting from the paradigm that Georgia's territories are occupied, will remain under operation. It should be emphasized, that with our approach we should make a maximum effort to, even within the available legal frames, open opportunities in order to involve both international and local non-governmental sectors. Unlike the previous authority, the approach, in general, should be focused not on control and restriction, but on expanding relationship based on cooperation and trust.

Geneva negotiations have also been inherited. It is particularly important that in this direction we cooperate with the representative of the former authority, with the one immediately involved in this process. We would like certain continuity to be maintained in this problem. The Geneva format remains to be the format of Georgian-Russian relations and despite the mixed opinions – whether it has to be changed or not – our current attitude and the short-term task are to maintain this format in its present form; however, it cannot be excluded, that some other types of contacts might be developed with the Abkhazians and Ossetians.

There is one more point we are continuing to support – it is the promise which the President made in Strasburg about not use of force. The President reinforced the unilateral obligation already resulted from the ‘Sarkozy-Medvedev’ 6-point agreement. By this the Georgian side will confirm once again that our intentions are peaceful and it is not connected to the factor of using force neither with rhetoric nor with action or content.

As far as the component related to the so called Strategy on Engagement and action plan are concerned, a number

of experts took part in creating this document at the time. It is known, that due to the terminology, its adoption was met by bitter reaction from Abkhazians and Ossetians . Actually, many ideas implied in this strategy and action plan are acceptable. It would be a huge success if we manage to create the basis and the background for accomplishing the points given in the strategy (those directed to restoring trust, deepening contacts, regulating various problems of utmost importance).

With regard to the law on occupied territories and modalities, it is remarkable that we will not have rough attitude



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ter's special representative for Russian affairs. It is remarkable, that actually it will be impossible to restore normal diplomatic relations while the occupation is under way and embassies are opened both in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali – South Ossetia – regions. However, it is possible and we are ready to normalize relations at the practical level – economic and commercial relations. It was the message of the Georgian authority. We are permanently carrying out consultations and at this stage we are anticipating reciprocal actions, although we are not confined to only anticipation and I am sure that Mr. Abashidze is doing his best in order to improve the situation.

We have certain resources for action in the restricted space:

1. Peaceful change of the authority, which is a fact of ma-

jor importance and the reality by itself, but it is equally interesting what it means to the Ossetian and the Abkhazian sides. Previously they believed that Mikheil Saakashvili and his power were the side which was impossible to conduct a dialogue with. There occurred certain personification and demonization of the ruling power, whether deserved or undeserved, and the image of the enemy was formed in their shape. Now the argument that “they wouldn’t speak to Saakashvili” has been withdrawn. We have some resource to establish direct contacts. We have people who command trust among the opposed side (e.g. Paata Zakareihvili, Irakli Alasania, Guram Odisharia and so on) and their contribution in restoring trust would be useful. However, just this factor is not enough for changing the situation. Thus, we think, that the chosen route has to be continued; at the same time, the change of the situation in the country against the background of proper democratic reforms will probably give us the opportunity to expand communication and overcome distrust with Abkhazian and Ossetian sides.

2. Georgian-Russian relations are far more multilateral and complicated and demands work and coordination of a number of departments. Without this point it is difficult to imagine that achieving success is possible through long-term projects and viewpoints.
3. Contacts with Abkhazian and Ossetian sides used to be ignored. As for recognizing these sides as conflict sides both factually and legally (resulting from the occupation paradigm), is connected to certain casa. Therefore, we will need to work harder in order to cut communication channels to these people, even at the informal, semi-formal or any other level, which would imply politically less connotation, will not violate main messages and will not affect state interests. The reaction of the “other side” has to be taken into consideration. As we know, there is a tendency that any step will be labeled and perceived as one more step forward to independence. Thus, it is necessary to restore these contacts through careful policy, in order to get any chance of discussing the matter.

What is needed to do so? Just changing the persons is not sufficient. We think that we will make single-sided steps which might be perceived as constructional by the other side. Reinforcement of the obligation of not using force, derived from the previous authority, might be considered one of such steps. How could we make other, symbolic steps which would have great political importance for the other side? For example, changing the name of our ministry which is not a simple issue either in procedural or essential terms. It is important what the name of the ministry will be. At least, according to the received messages, “Reintegration” is unacceptable to Abkhazians and Ossetians. It hinders their willingness to establish any relationship with us. There

are some other practical steps, international projects directed towards people’s needs, beyond borders, which were hindered due to various political connotations and we are looking for ways how to put them into practice so that people would get some kind of profit as well as satisfy their needs. Such projects may deal with the development of infrastructure, including supplying with gas. Also, there is a program, which is under way and was one of the successful lines of the former authority – the program of healthcare in which the residents mainly from Abkhazian region were involved. Single-sided steps made by us give us the opportunity to test what is happening at the other side. The Abkhazians and the Ossetians are willing to communicate and have a dialogue, but their statements are often different. They are given a chance to identify that yet under intensive russification it is still possible to conduct a dialogue based on trust and guarantees with the Georgian side.

4. The non-governmental sector is another important resource, as the scope of action of the official structure is naturally restricted. Our meetings with many international organizations and representations were not just introductory. We had a discussion about cooperation and mutual assistance. According to the Abkhazian media, they are intending to limit the area of activities of international organizations, to leave them only in Gali and to expel them from the rest of the region. It concerns not only the humanitarian organizations. Under these circumstances, establishing any kind of control from the Georgian side is not relevant, to our viewpoint, and is not justifiable either from rational or strategic points of view. It is important for us to increase the involvement of the civic society. For this we will be as open as possible and we will encourage the effort directed towards establishing contacts, restoring trust, etc.

There are mutual interests as well, naturally, not many, but they are economic, commerce, exchange issues, etc. I have spoken how we could create a frame for discussing other type, wider scale projects loaded with important content. There are a number of studies, for example, and we are aware of the fact that freight turnover and commerce occurred in the past and still do despite toughening the control at the border, on the Inguri. Since 29 October 2012 Russians have been conducting full control over the situation. Naturally, one of the priorities is freedom of movement and simplifying these conditions for the local population moving to and fro with commercial purposes. Healthcare and education are equally important fields requiring assistance and creation of encouragement mechanism. We are concerned about human rights, the issue of Gali, problem of refugees which are so politicized in this discourse that they block attempts of discussing any other issues. This is why we have to consider it in the long

term and within the complex of various issues. I will mention once again that there is some interest from the other side too but without making a show - ecology, environment protection, exchange of professional groups, exchange between journalists and young people, which is in our interests too. It is also important to use certain contacts between expert communities and their encouragement. Our policy will be de-isolative, and we should employ all the possibilities which will not affect the state interest.

## STATUS- NEUTRALITY, AS THE POTENTIAL KEY TO CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

*Sergi Kapanadze*

Today, as Georgia has the new government, there exists a chance to move the efforts of conflict resolution to a higher level from Tbilisi's side. Official Tbilisi has already pronounced numerous points of views, but most of them remained just the ideas and they have not been followed by practical actions. One of those ideas was the restoration of the railway via Abkhazia, creating an economic center similar to the Erneti Market, recognizing the documents issued by Tskhinvali and Sokhumi and renaming the Ministry of Reintegration. Among these the latter is the easiest and the presumable names have already been thought of. The new ministry might be the one of 'reconciliation, peace and minority's issues', or the ministry of 'reconciliation and civil equality', or that of 'reconciliation and national minority's issues'. Qualitatively, all these names have one thing in common - they are all status-neutral names. So far presence of the term 'reintegration' in the name of the Ministry implied the concept that Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region had been lost and their incorporation, or reintegration had to be carried out. It was the very reason why Tskhinvali and Sokhumi refused to meet the representatives of this ministry. Now, with the introduction of the status-neutral name, the Georgian government is able to remove this excuse

from Tskhinvali's and Sokhumi's positions.

For the past four years status-neutrality has been a non-declared modus operandi of the Georgian authority in connection with the occupied territories. Behind this principle stood a sincere desire to let Sokhumi and Tskhinvali see that the issues related to the status were not regulated at this stage; however, other, comparatively minor issues were solvable, which probably are even more important for the local population, than the ephemeral discussion on the topic of the status. Such issues include resuming trade, free travel to each other, education, free participation in social and humanitarian activities, etc.

### What is status-neutrality?

Neutrality to the status does not imply recognizing Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region. It does not imply recognition of our sovereignty by Sokhumi and Tskhinvali either, or even changing Moscow's position towards the independence of these territories. Very simply saying, this principle can be expressed in the following phrase: "Let us agree on the fact that we cannot agree on the status. Let us agree that we will not force each other on topics related to the status, but we will start cooperation with the aim of restoring relations between peoples. In particular, with regard to Abkhazia, it will be neighboring relations, while for us it will be implementation of the involvement policy. Let us put emphasis on the content, and not on the form." At the same time, we should admit, that Georgia will continue international activities connected to legitimization of the occupation, while Russia will continue acquiring recognition, Tskhinvali and Sokhumi will continue their aspiration towards 'independence', and Georgia will carry on working for restoration of territorial integrity. Maintaining neutrality to the status does not mean that we approve of all this and say no to the territorial integrity. It just means, that we "agree on the fact that we cannot agree". Thus, it will become possible to transform the conflict from the present status quo in the way that the conflict becomes irrelevant.

Where exactly was the status-neutral approach used in previous years?

**Formation of Geneva discussions:** anyway, Geneva International Discussions is not a status-neutral format. It is based on the ceasefire agreement of 12 August concluded between Georgia and Russia. Accordingly, it is the format for reaching security and stability in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region and for returning refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes. The so called 'Procedure note', founder of the Geneva Discussions, which underlies the formats determining the procedures, says that negotiations should occur at different levels (participants: Georgia, Russia, the USA, European Union, United Nations, OSCE) and at the levels of working groups (the above mentioned participants plus representatives from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is an obscure phrase and leaves the possi-



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equality', or that of 'reconciliation and national minority's issues'. Qualitatively, all these names have one thing in common - they are all status-neutral names. So far presence of the term 'reintegration' in the name of the Ministry implied the concept that Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region had been lost and their incorporation, or reintegration had to be carried out. It was the very reason why Tskhinvali and Sokhumi refused to meet the representatives of this ministry. Now, with the introduction of the status-neutral name, the Georgian government is able to remove this excuse

bility of considering representatives of legitimate authority in this formulation). At this stage plenary format is not operating, as Russia is unwilling to have a dialogue format with Georgia, which recognizes the former as the side of the conflict. Accordingly, the only format under operation at Geneva Discussions is the format of meeting of working groups. But this format, in its classic sense, is status-neutral. Its participants represent only themselves and not the countries, cities or capitals. They do not wear badges indicating names or countries and, therefore, are not authorized to sign anything. There has already been held 22 rounds within this format and, despite the fact, that there has not been any fundamental breakthrough, discussions still exist and the format has been retained.

### **Creating Incident Prevention and Respond Mechanisms**

In February 2009 mechanisms for preventing and responding to incidents were formed. It is mentioned in the document of forming these mechanisms, that “representatives of organs responsible for security and public order on corresponding territories” and representatives of international organizations should be involved in these mechanisms. This formulation is also neutral with regard to the status - it does not say which country’s, territorial unit’s or city’s representatives are corresponding organs. Despite this the mechanisms for incident prevention and respond continue operating, representative of corresponding departments participate in them, as well as the staff of the corresponding department of Sokumi and Tskhinvali. In short, it is the principle of status-neutrality that lies under the incident Prevention and Respond Mechanisms.

### **The agreement reached between Russia and Georgia while receiving membership of the World Trade Organization**

The thing that gave green light to Russian membership of World Trade Organization was the bilateral agreement signed between Georgia and Russia, which instituted international monitoring on the trade carried out between Russia and Georgia with respect to the occupied territories too. Despite this, neither the occupied territories, nor Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region separately are mentioned in the text of the document. This agreement too was based on neutrality to the status. In particular, the Swiss side determined trade corridors, which enabled the parties to avoid geographical terminology in an elegant way. Accordingly, instead of the Roki Tunnel, Psou or the names of check points there emerged geographical coordinates. On the whole, the agreement turned out to be acceptable for both sides, as Russia received the WTO membership, while Georgia acquired the possibility to institute international monitoring over Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia, also received instruments against Russia in case it continued placing embargo against Georgia.

**Taking responsibility for non-use of force by Georgia.** In 2010 the President of Georgia took unilateral responsibility that Georgia would not use force in order to restore territorial integrity. He declared this responsibility not only in his speech in front of the European Parliament on November 23, but he also reflected it in the letters sent to the leaders of every international organization participating in Geneva Discussions and to the President of the USA. Despite the fact, that the attitude towards the status is defined unequivocally in these letters, the form in which the President took this responsibility is unequivocally neutral to status. In particular, Georgia took this responsibility not bilaterally, not by signing an international agreement, not by registering the memorandum with Tskhinvali or Sokumi, or by registering any other type of judicial or political document (which would definitely have implications connected to the status), but in the form of a unilateral declaration. It is remarkable, that this responsibility was positively perceived by Moscow, as well as by Tskhinvali and Sokumi. By the way, analogous responsibilities were taken by the representatives of Tskhinvali and Sokumi too. Admittedly, Georgia does not recognize the international legal power of these statements (only states are entitled to taking unilateral responsibilities), but within the frame of Geneva Discussions the positive attitude to this problem was openly attested by the Georgian delegation. The only subject that has not taken the responsibility for not using force is Russia. However, on the 21st round of Geneva Discussions they started working on the document related to non-use of force. In case the work is conducted in the right channel, Russia might take the same responsibility through revealing neutral attitude towards the status.

It is noteworthy, that the positive attitude of the international community towards the status-neutral approach is unequivocal. During each of the above mentioned cases the international community supported such an approach, as it was possible to reach a pragmatic result. It is remarkable, that in 2009 the international community itself elaborated a status-neutral proposal for resuming the OSCE mission in Georgia. It occurred during the OSCE chairmanship of Greece. It was then that the project of restoring the presence of the OSCE in Georgia was elaborated. The project was unequivocally assessed as ‘status-neutral’. Although this project was blocked by Russia in the spring of 2009, it still ‘remains on the table’ and, hopefully, the OSCE will manage to find the way to return to this document. Presumably, it will not happen in 2013, during the Ukraine’s chairmanship, although it is quite predictable that it might happen during the chairmanship of Switzerland in 2014.

Neutrality to the status was incorporated in the state strategy and action plan for the occupied territories by the previous authority of Georgia. Everybody has heard of status-neutral travel documents and ID cards, as well as of liaison mechanisms and investment funds. These are the very ideas, whose implementation is possible only through

retaining neutrality to the status. Paata Zakareishvili, the State Minister for Reintegration of Georgia, made a statement several times that he intends to continue implementation of the strategy and action plan. If so, then there is a chance, that status-neutrality will be maintained in further relations between Tbilisi and Sokhumi, Tbilisi and Tskhinvali and, what is more, between Tbilisi and Moscow.

## MECHANISMS OF PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY SECTOR, EXISTING PRACTICE AND NEW PROSPECTS

*Shorena Lortkipanidze*

Using the mechanism of parliamentary oversight of the security sector means that there exists a rather firm ground for the development of democracy in the country. The possibility of the implementation of parliamentary oversight points to the fact, that the principle of power distribution in the state is in operation, where each branch of the authority fulfills its function. One of the most important functions of the Parliament is supervision over the security sector.

Efficient parliamentary control consists of the following issues:

- clear determination of constitutional and legal authorization;
- using universally recognized methods and instruments while implementing the control;
- possessing relevant resources and competence by the Parliament;
- presence of political will for implementing parliamentary control.<sup>1</sup>

The present article looks into the system of parliamentary oversight operating in Georgia through appreciating the above mentioned factors and their impact. First of all, we will overview legislative mechanisms, determine the methods practiced by the previous Parliament for implementing control and also to what extent it applied the instrument of the dialogue with the public.

It is equally important to appreciate the prospect of the Georgian Parliament of 2012 in terms of efficient use of the parliamentary oversight.

### Reform of the security sector and the Parliament

After the ‘Rose Revolution’ the reform of the security sector was declared as one of the top priorities of the country. The reform of the security sector aims to enhance the governance of the security sector, make it more efficient and fruitful while providing security under supervision and control. Governance of the security sector, in turn, refers

to bodies, processes, values and attitudes which form decisions made towards security and their implementation.<sup>2</sup>

Together with other institutions, the Parliament is the basic institution which develops legislation in the security sector, authorizes expenses connected to security, and conducts supervision over security services as well as over executive and civic bodies.<sup>3</sup>

There does not exist a specific model of the security sector. The reform is largely determined by the country’s context. There are three approaches: according to the first one, the

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reform of the security sector is initiated by donors with the purpose of reaching efficiency in the development assistance policy in the country. According to the second approach, the reform of the security sector in post-authoritarian countries presents an instrument for simplifying conceptualization and coordination of the reforms in the spheres of defense and internal security (in this case we are dealing with post-Socialist and post-Soviet countries); the third approach is the post-conflict reconstruction of the security sector, which means carrying out the reforms in the countries which have gone through brutal armed conflicts.<sup>4</sup>

The role of a parliament in the security sector reform is absolutely essential. If we go back to the context analysis, all three approaches are relevant in the case of Georgia. Georgia is a post-Soviet country; it has experienced several wars over the past 20 years and actors of international assistance played a significant role in terms of starting democratic processes and supporting the country. The process of reforming is under way, although consistence of reforms has always been one of the most important hazards to the development of the security sector. Frequent alteration of persons in charge of defense and security sector has also had a negative impact on forming defense and security as sustainable democratic institutions.

As it has already been mentioned, the role of parliament from the point of view of security sector reform is crucial, which the parliament does implement applying its consti-

2 DCAF Backgrounder, Security Sector Governance and Reform, [www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)

3 DCAF Backgrounder, Security Sector Governance and Reform, [www.dcaf.ch](http://www.dcaf.ch)

4 Conceptualizing Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction, Heiner Hanggi, DCAF

tutional and parliamentary entitlement.

### **Constitutional and Parliamentary Entitlements**

The Georgian Constitution reads: “The Parliament of Georgia is the supreme representative body of the country, which shall exercise legislative power, determine the principle direction of domestic and foreign policy, exercise control over the activity of the Government within the framework determined by the Constitution and discharge other powers.”<sup>5</sup>

The law about defense entitles the Parliament the following power: the Parliament determines the state policy of defense, establishes the military doctrine and the conception of military development, adopts laws of defense, considers the military budget, confirms it and establishes the amount of military forces, ratifies, denounces and cancels military contracts, exercises control in the sphere of defense over the development of Georgia’s armed forces and implementation of legislation. The Defense and Security Committee of the Parliament of Georgia exercises the functions foreseen by the Georgian Law on ‘The Committees of the Parliament of Georgia’. Martial law shall be confirmed by the Parliament.<sup>6</sup>

The Parliament creates legal and legislative parameters concerning security issues. Draft laws on security and defense problems are prepared by the executive power, but the role of the Parliament in discussing draft laws is essential. The Parliament is able to demand amendments. The Parliament is also obliged to carry out control over putting laws into effect.

The parliamentary mechanism of control also includes such mechanisms as supervision over the defense budget, approval or disapproval of participation of Georgia’s armed forces in peace-keeping operations, purchases in the sphere of defense, determination of security and defense policy and approval or disapproval of the relevant documents, ratification of defense and security composition.<sup>7</sup>

### **Defense and Security Committee**

Standing orders of the Parliament of Georgia determines the work rules of the committees of the Parliament, directions and entitlements. Defense and Security Committee is one of the most important mechanisms of supervising over the security sector. According to the law, the Parliament is granted vast power, participates in preparing and amending draft laws, reviews international and regional agreements under Georgia’s Defense Ministry. The following departments are subordinate to the Defense and Security Committee in terms of control: the Ministry of Defense, Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, Special Service for

5 Constitution of Georgia, article 48.

6 Law on Emergency, article 2.

7 Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Control, Effective Parliamentary Control, Conditions and Mechanisms

the Protection of the State, Border Police Department, Foreign Intelligence Department.

Defense and Security Committee is responsible for the preparation of recommendations for parliamentary debates on defense budget. However, the parliamentary committee has no access to the detailed budget of defense and security departments before they are confirmed.<sup>8</sup> This limitation reduces the Parliaments capability to have influence on planning defense and security resources: members of the Parliament are unable to demand amendments in the budget draft law which the government presents to the Parliament. In accordance with the law, the Parliament either ratifies or completely rejects the ratification of the budget.<sup>9</sup>

### **Group of Trusts, as an Important Mechanism of Efficient Parliamentary Control**

The law on Group of Trusts was adopted in 1998. “With the aim of conducting budget control of special programs and secret activities of the departments of Georgia’s executive authority, the Group of Trusts is formed in the Defense and Security Committee composed by the members of the same committee.”<sup>10</sup>

The members of the Group of Trusts are entitled to examine the details of defense expenses. According to one recent amendment, today the group consists of five deputies: the head of the Defense and Security Committee, who, at the same time, chairs the Group of Trusts, one deputy elected by majority vote, one member from the Majority of the Parliament and two representatives of the Minority.

According to the law, “if a member of the Group of Trusts considers on the basis of the presented secret material that the relevant bodies or their heads are violating Georgian legislation, he/she addresses the President of Georgia in writing with the demand of lifting state security label from this piece of information.”<sup>11</sup> However, there has not been an example of such a situation so far. The Group of Trust has never declared total distrust to any of the bodies of the executive authority.

### **Practice of Control of Defense Resources - Inter-Coordination of the Chamber of Control and the Parliament**

Confidential articles in the budget of the Ministry of Defense are prerogative of the control of the Group of Trust. According to Georgian legislation, the Group of Trust has

8 In terms of control the mandate of the Defense and Security Committee of the Parliament is conducted over the following departments of the mentioned sector: the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, Special Service for the Protection of the State, Border Police Department, Foreign Intelligence, which is under the direct control of the President and the Security Council also possesses a certain mechanism for its control.

9 Law on the Budget System of Georgia, article 22).

10 Law on Group of Trusts, article 1.

11 Law on Group of Trust.

the right to make official requisition of detailed information from the Ministry of Defense on purchases foreseen in confidential articles. There used to be a practice in the previous Parliament when the Parliament became aware of the purchases carried out by the Ministry of Defense only post factum.

Chamber of Control conducts the audit of the fulfillment of the budget. It sends reports to the Defense and Security Committee. If any inaccuracy is detected in the report by the Chamber of Control, then the Defense and Security committee considers it, summons the person in charge to the Parliament and the case may end with either dismissing relevant persons from work or with starting legal proceedings against them. However, there has not occurred this practice in the Georgian Parliament in recent years either.

In the 2008 convocation of the Parliament the Defense and Security Committee was actually eliminated from the process of decision making on defense and security, the Parliament's actual function was only to adopt resolutions proposed by the government.

The Defense and Security Committee is responsible for preparing recommendations for parliamentary debates on the defense budget. However, according to the practice employed by the previous Parliament, the Parliamentary Committee was not given access to the detailed budget of defense and security departments before its official adoption.

Such a limitation reduces the Parliament's capability of having influence on planning resources of defense and security: members of the Parliament are unable to demand concrete and well-founded changes to the budget draft law proposed to the Parliament by the government.<sup>12</sup>

Despite the above mentioned restrictions, Georgian legislation has the possibility to conduct efficient supervision on the sphere of defense and security. However, there are hardly any examples of employing control mechanisms in recent years. The Parliament has not virtually exercised its monitoring function.

### **Inter-coordination between the Civil Society and the Defense and Security Committee of the Parliament**

Since the late 90s there has existed a civil council at the Defense and Security Committee which was composed by experts in defense and security issues, journalists, representatives of the civil society, human rights defenders. The Council used to be a consultation organ and, at the same time, it made civil and democratic monitoring over the sector available. Important conceptual documents and draft laws were discussed at the Council meetings. Such a practice does not actually exist today, thought the Civil Council still continues existing formally. The 2008 convocation of

the Parliament did not hold a single meeting which would have the form of a report or consultation.

This fact indicates that civil control was not actually implemented. Accordingly, the monitoring function of the Parliament over the sector significantly reduced.

### **Rights of Military Servicemen and the Defense and Security Committee**

The problem of defending the rights of military servicemen has been put under the mandate of healthcare and social security of the Parliament. However, the Defense and Security Committee of the Parliament implements its mandate with regard to the rights of military servicemen in the following issues: dismissing from work, matters connected to ranks, disputes on wage arrears. The Committee gets acquainted with citizen's letters and the lawyers of the Committee organ give responses; the letters are either forwarded to the relevant organ or the assistance is carried out within the frames of the Committee's competence.

### **Political Will - the Basic Element of Implementing Parliamentary Oversight**

The new Parliament has the chance and the possibility to break the vicious circle and make the processes taking place in the sector transparent. However, it will be possible only in the case if the civil society is actively involved in the process of law making, when it is able to discuss the suitability of a legislative initiative and also when military units are open to the civil society in terms of protection of human rights of the defense and security personnel.

It is essential that strategic issues are considered inside the Parliament, especially the tasks connected to integration with the NATO and European Union.

The political will of the new authority determines the possibility of implementing efficient parliamentary and public supervision. Without the political will the security sphere will remain a blocked machine which might turn into an obstacle to the process of democratization or even the deterrent to this process.

### **GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESULTS IN REGULATING ETHNIC CONFLICTS**

*Izolda (Olga) Tigiev*

Over the past 20 years, since hostilities started in Georgia and there developed ethnic conflicts, many international organizations have been actively involved in conflict resolution and stabilization in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Specialized foundations as well as the government took

12 Law of Georgia on Budget System, article 22).

part in financing the projects of this direction. As far as the strategic line of these projects and their implementation are concerned, only a few of non-governmental organizations were occupied in practical implementation of the views worked out by international peacekeeping organizations. Plenty of human resources (throughout Georgia), an astronomical amount of financial sources, labor of invited specialists of different fields of social sciences have been spent during the last 15 years. Drawing up projects funded by international organizations and their implementation created a certain economic niche in Georgia's life.



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There emerged professionals whose main business is elaboration and implementation of such projects. By itself, there is nothing bad about it, but if we go back to the main objective of the whole activity and analyze present results, we will not find it satisfactory. Naturally, nobody anticipated that all the political problems would be arranged by non-governmental organizations and peace-keeping foundations, but one can hardly

observe even a minimal progress and there is no prospect of improving the situation in the future either.

Very often, after the implemented and completed projects there is an impression that the fact, that the activities of these organizations in most cases come up against problems from the interested sides of a conflict, is not the only obstacle. In our opinion, the main reason for this is that there exists clear and coordinated policy of eradicating ethnic hostility and conflict resolution. Donor organizations have their own priorities and views of the problems. All these organizations implement and finance projects and efforts according to their budget and plans, which do not often match with real situations and specific problems that call for immediate response.

Apart from that, after 20-year-long working experience these organizations formed certain working stereotypes. They acquired permanent partners who meet the demands of these organizations, but often only formal work is conducted which is limited to certain, same subjects.

What could be called a high quality progress in Georgia in terms of ethnic conflicts resolution? Obviously, certain changes have come about. People of different nationalities are not trying to destroy each other physically any more, hostilities were ceased in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, general stability, based on truce and separation of antagonistic sides with the interference of the third state, has been maintained. This sum of money includes the income tax

foreseen by Georgian legislation. The third force, on the other hand, takes advantage of the situation and tries to misappropriate the territories of Georgian state compactly inhabited by non-Georgian population. This seeming stability is not the result of efforts made by non-governmental and peace-keeping organizations, but the one of the political processes developing in the region. There is no multilateral plan which implies making joint efforts by non-governmental, international, peace-keeping organizations and Georgian government, not to mention attracting self-declared governmental formations existing on Georgia's territory and their involvement.

There is no detailed plan with clearly indicated goals including interests of the Georgian state, the ones of the non-Georgian population of the conflict regions and the principled position of international organizations with its standards of protecting human rights and the principles of state governance.

Besides, there is not a single coordination center which would accumulate, analyze and make use of the information about peace situation in Georgia; it would be the center capable of cooperating with all the sides involved and interested in the process. Establishing the central coordinating body of this kind is the necessity prompted by the present situation and by the lack of the perspective of the peace-keeping policy carried out so far. Lack of perspective, factual improvement of optimistic predictions and situation sound a little sharp, but, in spite of this, reflects the essence of present situation.

Consequently, it is time to change the principles of cooperation between international peace-keeping non-governmental organizations involved in this problem and Georgian government. Georgian government should have a more serious approach to the problems connected to the country's security and eventual regulation of ethnic conflicts on its territory. Georgia's government elaborated a general document – 'State Strategy towards Occupied Territories - through Involvement and Cooperation', which, by itself, is an ideal doctrine for putting peace-keeping goals throughout Georgian territory into effect. This document is employed by both governmental official departments and various non-governmental organizations involved in conflict resolution. The only fault the document has is that it does not state specific subjects responsible for implementing the declared goals, who should take charge of fulfilling specific tasks. In this context it is necessary to put forward the role of non-governmental, especially peace-keeping international organizations.

'State Strategy towards Occupied Territories - through Involvement and Cooperation' implies maximal involvement of organizations and bodies existing on the occupied territories. It would also be desirable to pay more attention to the Georgian and international organizations which work

in partnership with the occupied territories. They would be able to have actual impact on the processes and to increase positive interests of the sides instead of creating the image of an enemy and carrying out activities focused on negative propaganda occurring so far.

Taking current situation into account, there is no point in speaking about high-quality changes without intensive involvement of all the sides of the conflict and state bodies. Problems of organizational type which are enhanced by conflicting interests are obvious. It is necessary to form a neutral coordinating and controlling body which would be able to draw up a multilateral working plan and give direction to the efforts of all the interested sides.

It is also time to give an unbiased estimation to the 20-year-long work of international peace-keeping organizations and non-governmental ones in Georgia and, if necessary, make an attempt to change their style and means of working in order to receive more efficient results.

Finally, every organization as well as every citizen, having any contact with the occupied territories – familial or personal – should take care and work on restoring trust, intensifying folk diplomacy. This will lead us step by step to more effective results and let us think about restoring territorial integrity in not very near future.

Jehovah's Witnesses, Baptists, Pentecostal.

As far as the Pridnestrovje's armed conflict is concerned, it had political, historic and economic reasons.

### **Reasons for the Outbreak of Pridnestrovian Conflict**

The reasons for the outbreak of Pridnestrovje conflict are the following:

1. The imperial policy of the Kremlin which is aimed at ensuring Russian hegemony in the region. It is in Pridnestrovje that Moldova's power energy as well as 60 percent of its industries are accumulated. Accordingly, as a result of separating Pridnestrovje from Moldova, the Kremlin was given the possibility to establish its control over Moldova's power energy and industries.
2. Presence of a strong pro-Muscovite lobby on the territory of Pridnestrovje (so called 'red directors' and Party and Comsomol functionaries) striving for taking possession of factories and power sites located in Pridnestrovje.
3. The enhancement of pseudo-international, extremist elements in Pridnestrovje, which was promoted by both the Kremlin and the pro-Muscovite lobby existing in Pridnestrovje.
4. The enhancement of the extremist wing within Moldova's popular front, irresponsible and extremist slogans and actions.
5. Pridnestrovje and Moldova formed parts of different states over centuries. This conditioned both their ethnic diversity and language contradictions (in Pridnestrovje 66 percent of the population is russophone) and formation of different lifestyles and values.
6. During the Second World War the chauvinist politics of Romania caused to break out hostility between the populations of the West and East banks of the Dniester.

Thus, there existed political, economic, and historic bases for the rise of the conflict. It created a proper background and the armed conflict was incited. The first clashes, as it is known, occurred in 1989. In 1990 the formation of the Pridnestrovian Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova was declared. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union it was called Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.

### **Escalation of the Conflict and Its Effects**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union hostilities started in Pridnestrovje. It reached its peak in Summer 1992. The following participated in the hostilities:

1. The Army and Militia;
2. The Guard of Pridnestrovje;
3. Volunteers from Russia (Kazaks);

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Christians. Besides, there live people of Catholic and Greco-catholic confession; among sects the most widespread are



#### 4. Volunteers from the Ukraine (UNA-UNSO formation).

After the involvement of Russia's 14th Guards Army in the affair (Commander General Lebedev) Moldavians retreated. Soon a cease-fire was concluded between Russia and Moldova in Moscow. The Moldavians conceded that Russian 'Blue Berets' were put in charge of establishing peace. Military activities came to an end and the conflict moved to the stage of 'frozen conflict'. As far as the victims are concerned, the Moldovan side claims that 4,500 people were killed during the hostilities, while according to official Tiraspol there were 1,500 victims and the majority were peaceful citizens.

#### Pridnestrovje Today

Russian peacemaking troops actually defended Russian interests in Pridnestrovje, rather than peace. As a result, the separatist regime has widely rooted there. Although corruption and coercion have been established in Pridnestrovje, still certain state bodies have been created, the Army has been formed, the so called 'national currency' was introduced (Pridnestrovian ruble), banks have been established. As for the current situation of the Pridnestrovian Army, see the following:

1. Pridnestrovian Army owns 18 tanks (T-645b), 15 pieces of air machines including fighter helicopters and jets, 30 howitzers and cannons, 40 pieces of machines of 'Grad' type (local production), mortars. The Army is formed on the basis of general military call-up. Demobilized soldiers and non-commissioned officers are automatically transferred to reservists. The officers are trained at the Military Institute of the Tiraspol University. Apart from the Armed Force there is a National Army too.
2. In peacetime the number of soldiers amounts to 7,000, while in wartime this number may increase to 25,000.

From the point of view of economics, it bears a clearly distinct clan nature. The leading part is played by the company "Sheriff", behind which stand persons in authority and those close to them. The current president of Pridnestrovje Yevgeni Shevchuk has also come out of this company. Petrol, wine and cognac businesses are under 'Sheriff's control. The company owns bread factories, publishing houses, television channels, newspapers, fitness complexes, and the football club 'Sheriff'. The company has total control over foreign trade in Pridnestrovje, in particular, the export of wine and alcoholic beverages to Russia and the Ukraine. The company is also called the Pridnestrovian oligarch's club. It was within the 'Sheriff' that the so called 'Young Wolves' emerged and came in authority. Among them is Shevchuk, the current 'president' of Pridnestrovje. At first Russia encouraged the formation of Pridnestrovian 'elite'. However, the stronger the 'elite' was getting, the more obvious its dissatisfaction towards the attacking Russian

capital was becoming. Russian capital is much stronger than the Pridnestrovian one and, accordingly, it is trying to establish control over Pridnestrovian energy and industry. Presently, Russians hold control of the following important sites:

1. Moldova's regional hydro station (situated at the city of Dnistrovsk), the most important object of Moldova's energy. It is under the ownership of the Russian company 'INTER RAO UES'.
2. The factory 'Pribor', situated at Benderi, is under control of the Russian company 'Salut'.
3. The most powerful radio station 'Maiak', through which broadcasting of programs was carried out through Asian and African countries in Soviet times. Now it has gone into the ownership of Russia's television and radio broadcast net (the state company).

Russian business made attempts to get hold of the metallurgical factory of Pridnestrovje - the most important object of the local industry. The Russian businessman Suleimanov, who made efforts to do so, came up against competition with the Ukrainian Renat Akhmetov. As a result of the agreement between Suleimanov and Akhmetov, the industrial complex came under the ownership of both. Russian business tried to establish control over the Dubosar Hydro Station, the second most powerful energy object, but it failed. So far the hydro station is under control of the Ministry of Energy of Pridnestrovje.

Pridnestrovje conducts export of electric energy to Moldova, as well as to Romania and Bulgaria. This fact made the Republic of Pridnestrovje an important regional actor, though the international isolation of Pridnestrovje proved favorable to maintaining the clan and corrupted system thriving there. Just as Smirnov, the so called 'first President of Pridnestrovje', the current president Shevchuk too has been declared persons non-grata. The problems existing at Pridnestrovje were not settled either. There is still much unemployment and the outflow of the population, especially the youth, is high. All these condition dependence of Pridnestrovje on its neighbors, especially Russia.

#### The Analysis of the Russian Plan of Conflict Resolution

In 1989 the Kremlin inspired the conflict in Pridnestrovje. Krjuchkov, the then chief of the KGB, and A. Lukianov, the then Head of the Supreme Council of the USSR, stood behind this action. Their goal was:

A Minimum Programme:

1. To enhance the extremist-populist wing (Mircha Druk and his supporters) of the 'National Front' in Moldova, to discredit the Moldovan national movement in the eyes of the international community, to demonstrate it as an anti-Semitic, extremist movement, which pronounces irresponsible, unrealistic slogans (integration

- with Romania, racial purity, etc.), which threatens stability in the region.
2. To inspire alienation among the Moldovans (those identifying themselves with Romanians and with Moldovans).
  3. To ignite hostility between the russophone population and that residing on the Right Bank of the Dniester; to enhance separatist, pro-Muscovite forces in Pridnestrovje.

#### The Maximum Programme:

1. To bring forces favorable to Lukianov and Kravchuk, which were gathered round P. Luchinski, the then First Secretary of the Communist Party of Moldova.
2. To make Pridnestrovje a strong russophone enclave which would become the guarantee of keeping Moldova on the Muscovite orbit and which would perform the function of putting pressure on the Ukraine (slogans about restoration of Novorossia governorate).
3. To intensify chaos in the USSR, to create favorable conditions for coup d'état, to enhance the forces in the state bodies of Moldova which would support all this.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the Moldovan authority (President Snegur and Prime-Minister Muravskii) tried to regulate the conflict using force. They supported Yeltsin during the State Emergency. It was going to provide the hope, that Yeltsin would take neutral position in case of carrying out actions using force. The hope was not realized. Although at first Yeltsin hesitated, but then he supported the chauvinists. The Russian plan can be formulated as follows:

1. To establish control over Pridnestrovje with the help of Russian Army, to put Moldova's industry and energy under complete Russian control.
2. To expel the 'hawks' (Prime Minister Muravskii and Defense minister Lukash) from Moldovan authority, to force the Moldovan authority to consent to deploying Russian Peacemaking Forces in Pridnestrovje, to discredit and disperse anti-Russian forces in Moldova, to bring Moldova back to Russian orbit.
3. To maintain Russian base camps in Pridnestrovje, to enhance positions of Russian intelligence services and Russian business, to make Pridnestrovje a strong Russian enclave.

Russia has intended to fulfill this plan so far. If during President Yeltsin it occurred inconsistently, the situation changed after Putin's arrival in authority. Russia became much rougher and more aggressive. It is equally true for Moldova and Pridnestrovje. Russia tried to make Tiraspol feel clearly that it was dissatisfied with its actions. The Kremlin considered the attempts of Pridnestrovian elite to

prevent industries and energy objects from transferring under Russia's control unacceptable. Medvedev declared to Smirnov, the leader of Pridnestrovje, that Moscow could reconsider its plans and in case of Moldova's loyalty it might even subdue Pridnestrovje. Soon Russia made a new step - it represented its own plan of resolution of Pridnestrovian conflict through the so called Kozak Memorandum. It can shortly be formulated as follows:

1. Moldova has to turn into an asymmetric federation and the name of the republic has to become Federal Republic of Moldova.
2. Pridnestrovje has to be conferred a special status within the united Moldova. It is reflected in the following: a. Pridnestrovje has its own president, parliament and armed forces; b. Pridnestrovian Parliament has the right of using veto over any decision of the Moldovan Parliament that contradicts to the interests of Pridnestrovje; c. if Moldova decides to join any other state, Pridnestrovje is given the right to separate from Moldova.
3. Gagauzia is conferred wide autonomy.
4. Russian troops remain in Pridnestrovje for the further 20 years.

Voronin, the then President of Moldova (leader of the Communist Party) consented to this plan. It brought the students of Kishinev out on the streets. Voronin conceded. Implementation of the Kozak Memorandum fell through.

Russia, which is the actual initiator of Pridnestrovian conflict, still continues trying to fulfill its imperial plans. The result is obvious - the conflict has not been regulated yet.

#### The Role of the Ukraine in Conflict Resolution

Creating a Russian enclave in Pridnestrovje caused serious concern for Kiev. If this enclave became stronger, the territorial integrity of the Ukraine would be called into question. Not only Russian chauvinism, but the Romanian one was equally dangerous too. Romanian radicals claimed their pretension to Odessa. Thus, the Ukraine had to work out its own approach and a point of view of Pridnestrovian conflict. It did not happen. During the period of conflict escalation (Summer 1992) official Kiev did not interfere with the processes, though there began slaughter of the Ukrainians in Pridnestrovje. Only the volunteers from the Ukraine (formation of UNA UNSO) got involved in the hostilities. The Ukrainian state interfered with the events in Pridnestrovje only in 1995. Official Kiev acted very carefully. In short, its action plan can be formulated as follows:

1. To recognize territorial integrity of Moldova.
2. To refuse to take any action which will cast doubt on Russia's, as the hegemony's, role. To refrain from criticizing the policy of peacemakers and the Kremlin.
3. To establish contacts with the authorities of Pridnestrovje.

- vje, especially with the persons of the Ukrainian nationality. To bring the Ukrainian business in Pridnestrovje.
4. To contain oneself maximally from stating its clear position in Russia-Moldova- Pridnestrovje negotiations.

Little by little the Ukraine's actions are becoming more and more daring. A joint Ukrainian-Moldovan commission is being formed on demarcation of the border. However, the Ukraine still refrains from taking any harsh steps. The authority of Pridnestrovje demanded to be involved in the border demarcation. They were rejected, as the Republic of Pridnestrovje has not been recognized by the international community. Despite this, the Ukraine refrained from concrete actions with regard to the border demarcation. At the time action plan of the Ukraine changes too. It can shortly be formulated as follows:

1. To get actively involved in Russia-Moldova- Pridnestrovje negotiations and, at the same time, to refuse to confront with Russia.
2. To recognize the principle of territorial integrity of Moldova.
3. To encourage receiving Ukrainian citizenship for the Ukrainian nationality citizens of Pridnestrovje; to enhance the positions of the Ukrainian business in Pridnestrovje.
4. To establish close contacts with the Ukrainians in the Pridnestrovian authority, to attempt to create a Ukrainian Diaspora and a pro-Ukrainian lobby.

The Ukraine tried to find a certain 'happy medium' and to please the Moldovan authority as well as Pridnestrovians and Russians. Ukraine's involvement in the affair of regulation of Pridnestrovian problem certainly neutralized Russian influence to some extent, which was favorable to both Moldovans and Pridnestrovians, who had already been concerned about excess attack of Russian capital. At the same time, the Ukraine's authorities never displayed their own plan of the conflict resolution, never tried to put Russia's dominant role under question. The only Ukrainian president who dared and placed his own plan against the Russian one was Victor Yushchenko. In response to the Kozak Memorandum Yushchenko presented his own plan (Yushchenko's Plan):

1. Moldova must be converted into a federal state, Pridnestrovje is conferred a special status within the Moldovan Republic.
2. If Moldova decides to form part of a different state, Pridnestrovje is conferred the right to separate from Moldova.
3. Russian peacemaking forces have to leave Pridnestrovje and Russian military base camps have to be withdrawn as well.

4. In the transition period international peacemaking contingent has to be in charge of establishing peace.
5. Genuinely democratic elections should be held in Pridnestrovje.

As a result of Russia's objection 'Yushchenko's Plan' fell through. After Victor Yanukovich's arrival in authority official Kiev did not state its own position with regard to Pridnestrovje for some time, though Ukrainian business-groups still continued their active work in Pridnestrovje. While in opposition Yanukovich used to blame Yushchenko for the lack of attention towards Pridnestrovian Ukrainians, for the fact, that the President made only general statements and presented 'unrealistic plans'. After Yanukovich's arrival in authority he did not state his own point of view for a long time either. In Ukraine accusations aimed at Yanukovich were heard too according to which he did not have his own point of view about the problem of Pridnestrovje (the meeting held in Odessa in September 2012). It was only in October this year that Kiev started demarcation of its border with Pridnestrovje, according to the resolutions of the joint Ukraine-Moldova demarcation commission. This caused protest of Pridnestrovian Parliament. Future holds it how consistent Yanukovich is going to be.

#### **The Role of International Community in Conflict Resolution of Pridnestrovje**

International community displayed certain passivity towards Pridnestrovje for some time. Apparently, the West, especially the USA, tolerated with Russia's domination in the region to a certain moment and acted according to the principle 'bad peace is better than good war'. Romania's position is remarkable in this affair. In September 1991 Romania's President Iliesku made a statement, that if the Ukraine separated from the USSR, Romania would pose territorial pretensions to it. Iliesku mentioned Moldavian SSR (including Pridnestrovje) as well as Bukovina and Odessa Oblast as Romanian lands. In 1992 Romanian side declared to the Russian President that Romania was ready to refrain from integrating in the NATO, if the whole Pridnestrovje, Bukovina and Odessa Oblast were yielded to it. Russia turned the proposal down. After that official Bucharest became indifferent towards uniting Bessarabia and Romania as well as towards Pridnestrovian problems. The West started taking active steps in 2003. Both the USA and Germany increased their activities towards this problem. The USA's action plan can be formulated as follows:

1. To recognize Moldova's territorial integrity. To launch and intensify sanctions against the separatists.
2. To express negative attitude towards possible unification of Moldova and Romania.
3. To express negative attitude towards the referendum carried out in Pridnestrovje, where the population voted for joining Russia.

4. To express negative attitude towards any revelation of racism and xenophobia.
5. To assure both Kishinev and Tiraspol in the fact that using force is destructive for both Kishinev and Tiraspol.
6. To keep a firm position towards democratization of the Republic of Pridnestrovje.
7. To implement certain culture programmes with the view to cooling hostilities between Moldova and Pridnestrovje.

This plan came into operation to some extent, which (despite its being modest) still annoyed Russia. Many experts bring this fact as a reason for why the Kremlin inspired the referendum in Pridnestrovje. Russian experts (Markov, Zatulin) blame the USA for contributing to intensifying anti-Russian forces in Moldova by their action. Apart from the USA, Germany begins to take more and more action in the region. It is clearly confirmed by Angela Merkel's visit in Kishinev (2012). German Chancellor declared that her country is ready to support Moldova and to encourage conflict resolution in Pridnestrovje.

The activity of the international community in Pridnestrovje is still very cautious. Despite this fact, it significantly prevented the formation of a strong Russian enclave here. However, more action is necessary for settling the conflict.

### **Prospects for Conflict Resolution in Pridnestrovje**

The Pridnestrovje conflict belongs to the so called 'frozen' conflicts. Armed confrontation stopped here in 1992, but the problem has not been solved. Russia still regards Pridnestrovje as its advanced post in the region and interferes with the internal affairs of Pridnestrovje, as well as Moldova and the Ukraine, puts pressures on these countries, blackmails them and so on. All these prove unfavorable to the conflict resolution. In the future it is possible to regulate the conflict, although the following measures have to be taken:

1. With the mediation of the international community (European Union, the USA, etc.) negotiations should start between Moldova and Pridnestrovje, an agreement should be signed about not using force, both sides should condemn racism, chauvinism and xenophobia.
2. Consensus should be achieved between Moldova and Pridnestrovje on suppressing possible excesses and provocations with joint efforts. For this reason safety zones should be created, joint patrolling should be conducted and so on.
3. Humanitarian programmes which are aimed at slowing down hostility between the populations of Moldova and Pridnestrovje should come into operation, 'popular diplomacy' should be widely exploited, popular and authoritative persons (members of the clergy, writers,

public figures, sportsmen, etc.) should be involved in establishing peace and restoring mutual trust.

4. Business projects which will contribute to restoring economic ties between Moldova and Pridnestrovje have to come into operation.
5. An agreement has to be reached between the republics of Moldova and Pridnestrovje on formation of Federal Republic of Moldova and achieving full-scale autonomy for Pridnestrovje (a special status); leaders of both sides have to make a statement about inviolability of private ownership and steadfast protection of human rights in case of unification.
6. An agreement should be reached between Moldova and Pridnestrovje on withdrawing peacemaking contingent and replacing it by international peacemaking forces.
7. An agreement should be reached between Moldova and Pridnestrovje on withdrawal of Russian military base camps from the region.
8. A federal agreement should be drawn up between Moldova and Pridnestrovje under the aegis of the United Nations, Pridnestrovje must be conferred the right of separating from Moldova if the latter decides to join another state.
9. Implementation of the given plan is possible only in the case if the West (the USA, first of all), becomes extremely active in Pridnestrovje and throughout the whole post-Soviet world, which will cause Russia's neutralization. Final resolution of the Pridnestrovje conflict is possible only if these points are considered.



## THE BLACK SEA PEACEBUILDING NETWORK (BSPN) MISSION

The Black Sea Peacebuilding Network represents a first attempt to focus on robust civil society involvement in conflict resolution process in the Black Sea region. The project is implemented by the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) in partnership with the Crisis Management Institute (CMI) and supported by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. The project targets seven wider Black Sea region countries facing domestic conflicts and aims at empowering civil society to promote mediation and dialogue for effective conflict management. The project's purpose is to strengthen civil society peacebuilding at various levels (community, local, regional, national or international) to influence the understanding or attitude of conflict parties with new ideas and approaches. Furthermore, the establishment of the Black Sea NGO Forum provides the basis for a series of region-wide, broad-based initiatives such as creation of regional civil society platforms for linking local NGOs and civil society groups that are already involved and those that would like to engage for multiplying the peacebuilding efforts across the region. Moreover, the national forums have greater incentives to facilitate regional cooperation in crisis management and ensure close ties between NGOs, governments and the EU. GFSIS, as a local partner of CMI is responsible to create a forum of NGOs in Georgia and to organize meetings for the interested organizations and groups. The project comprises of three key components:

- Meetings, presentations, discussions organized on a regular basis with the participation of Georgian civil society actors and the Experts' Council, preparation of consecutive reports with the meeting findings and outcomes.
- The project web page created to post the project information, updates, experts' opinions, and data.
- The BSPN bulletin produced to familiarize the wider society with the project's work and to disseminate analytical papers about conflict resolution, peacebuilding, regional security, and stability, as well as about the EU's contribution and its role in peacebuilding prepared by the project's Georgian and foreign experts.

The project intends to increase the public's interest in conflict prevention, conflict management, transformation, and peaceful resolution, to contribute to wider public debates on these issues and to promote dialogue between all interested parties at the national and regional levels.

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